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WHAT MILITARY LESSONS CAN WE LEARN FROM THE KOREAN WAR, 1950-53?

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ABSTRACT

The war of 1950-1953 in Korea was the first war by the United Nations against an aggressive state in the twentieth century. The war was also the most significant conflict to emerge at the beginning of the Cold War and it led to be decisive the route of the Cold War. The Korean War was not only considerable reflection of the United States and the Soviet Union confrontation, but also they avoided direct combat each other in this conflict. This war shaped again how the West and the East dealt with each other and also caused part of a revolution in war in history. Indeed, without the Korean war, no other possible event could have created the impact of Korea on diplomatic and military options in world politics. The Korean war has created a situation where it avoided an important perceived war threat that reveals high-level conflicts and policies that it was associated with the cold war. In this context, this paper will examine the main military, diplomatic and political issues of the Korean War. The aim of this paper is to explore the characteristics and nature of Korean War, and also to examine why the Korean War was the birthplace of doctrine of limited war at beginning of the Cold War. In this way, it can be understood why the Korean war strongly influenced world politics, and how it created most of the features of the cold war.

Keywords: The Korean war, cold war, limited war, weapons systems.

INTRODUCTION

In Korea, the 1950-1953 war was the first war by the United Nations against an aggressive state in the twentieth century. In this context, the United Nation played a key role in challenging to aggressor country. The United Nations sent its troops not only to fight against communist regimes, but also needed to prove capable of acting with greater solution than its predecessor. The war was also the most significant conflict to emerge at the beginning of the Cold War and it leaded to be decisive the route of the Cold War. The Korean War was not only considerable reflection of the United States and the Soviet Union confrontation, but also they avoided direct combat each other in this conflict. During the conflict, the United State and its alliance, the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China met in combat on Korean peninsula; thus, even during the Cuban missile crisis, the world had never been very close to the third world war (Malkasian, 2001: 7).

After 1945, Korean peninsula was officially divided two sides by the United States and the Soviet Union. The thirty-eight parallel was the boundary between these countries' occupation zones. Under such condition, this division of Korea led to the emergence of two opposing Korean regimescby late 1948. The conflict began on June 1950 and it was lasted over three years. The Korean War was a civil war between the North Korea, encouraged by the Soviet Union to attempt to reunification through force of military, and the South Korea, supported by the United States. The end of the war in 1953, it was so obvious that this conflict was a painful and ambiguous event for either side. The casualties for Korean people, the United State and its alliance and communist forces were so horrific. For Koreans, of course, this war a total war that thousands of people either killed or wounded, as well as both sides lost many industrial plants and homes during the war.

Historically, this war shaped again how the West and the East dealt with each other and also caused part of a revolution in war history. Indeed, without Korean war, there would probably be no incidents that would have occurred the impact of Korea on diplomatic and military options in world politics. Firstly, the Korean war has created a situation where it avoided an important perceived war threat that reveals high-level conflicts and policies that it was associated with the cold war. Secondly and closely linked to the first situation, the Korean War was one example of major new developed weapons systems successfully tested out during the conflict. Because of the fact that, these developments in weapons technology have paved the way for states to avoid a war and to create the belief that limited wars are a great threat. Thus, this war facilitated to accelerate precisely cold war trend after the Second World War and affected the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. This paper will examine the main military, diplomatic and political issues of the Korean War. The aim of this paper is to explore the characteristics and nature of Korean War, and also to examine why the Korean War was the birthplace of doctrine of limited war at beginning of the Cold War. In this way, it can be understood why the Korean war strongly influenced world politics, and how it created most of the features of the cold war.

THE START OF THE WAR

The early hours of Sunday, 25 June 1950, the North Korean armed forces launched officially to attack on the Republic of Korea. "The North Korean forces were markedly better than their south Korean opponents in terms of numbers and experience" (Lowe, 2000: 21). They had been already trained and equipped by the Soviet Union and "large number of tanks, artillery, aircraft and small arms had been invested into the north Korean armed forces in 1949 and early 1950" (Malkasian, 2001). In contrast, the Republic of Korea (ROK)- the South Korea- was not well trained and equipped as the North Korea. In addition, "the ROK had no aircraft and no tanks, principally because the Truman administration distrusted Rhee, the South Korean leader, and feared that he might start a war if the ROK was given more aid" (Malkasian, 2001). In the other words, although the North Korean army had an air force, which consisted of 180 Soviet- built Yak fighters and Ilyushin bombers at the beginning of the conflict, the Republic of Korea did not have both an air force and anti craft batteries to prevent to the enemy air forces.

In addition, the Chinese revolution played a significant role in preparing the North Korea for the invasion because the North Korea administration had sent its troops to assist the Chinese Communist forces during the Chinese Civil War. Hence, the North Korean army contained troops with combat experience and very well trained. Nonetheless, the ROK Army was nearly unprepared, and the political establishment of the ROK could not able to succeeded in convincing the US administrators about the extent of the threat. With this background, the North Korean armed forces moved across all country and to reunite the country as its ideology.

The North Korean attack on the South Korea was answered immediately by the US government (Sweeney, 2007: 11). The US government made a decision to convoke an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council in order to prevent the South Korean against the North Korean attack. The Security Council had met in emergency session and after debating the issue, on June 25, the security council adopted a resolution calling for immediate international endorsement of hostilities, the withdrawal of North Korean forces in parallel to the 38th and international assistance to the UN in carrying out the resolution (Lee, 2001: 45). Following day, US President Harry S. Truman ordered the US air and naval forces attacking North Korean forces in Japan without asking Congress to declare war.

On the other hand, the United Nation had played a key role in efforts of state making, reconstruction and reunification of Korea after the Second World War. The Korean problem was one of the most difficult and complex issue in the United Nation. As a matter of fact, "it was the first major case to test the UN's capacity for international peace during the Korean War, which led to the transformation of the originally designed collective security system" (Pak, 2000: 16). When the conflict began on June 1950, the United Nation Security Council called North Korean to withdrawal forthwith to parallel that had been passed (Sadler, 1999: 151). Nonetheless, the Soviet Union was boycotting Council meetings since the 1950s to protest a permanent position in the UN Security Council of the Republic of China (Taiwan), and therefore could not

be actively involved in preventing the decision. After debating the matter, on 27 June 1950, the Security Council established a unified command that member state assist to the Republic of Korea.

Following the decision, Truman and his advisers set the stage for sending US forces to Korea under the authority of the UN. Truman decided that "General MacArthur should be appointed as a UN commander in Korea, since the United States would be contributing the vast majority of the UN forces and MacArthur was the greatest living American soldier with extensive experience of East Asia and the western Pacific" (Lowe, 1997: 199). In short, the Security Council established a unified command to control all the United Nations forces in Korea under the direct command of the US army Far East commander, Douglas MacArthur. Thus, all the military forces struggling with the occupation of North Korea were officially under the auspices of the UN, but were actually ordered by the US military. This was a unique arrangement in modern military history; although the command of the allied armies in World War II was coordinated at the highest levels, such as the High National Allied Forces Europe (SHAEF), with each national command structure, this situation began to change with the Korean War and the control of American began to appear (Sadler, 1999: 151).

In September 1950, UN troops launched an operation against North Korean army at Inchon. This attack enabled the UN forces to effectively block the North Korean army and expel it from the South. Although the Chinese have warned that the existence of UN forces in North Korea is unacceptable for the security of the People's Republic of China and even they indicated that this would force the People's Republic of China to intervene in the conflict, General MacArthur was sent to North Korea in order to demonstrate determination. The previous Chinese warnings were ignored, the 38th parallel was crossed, and many UN troops were moving towards the Yalu and Tumen rivers, threatening China's north-eastern border (Lowe, 1997: 231). The consequence of this development, Chinese volunteers started to attack on United Nation troops between October 1950 and January 1951. In this way, the United Nations forces found themselves confronted with Chinese volunteers all along the front areas. The US estimated that Chinese military force in Manchuria where it is the closest region to Korea Peninsula consisted of approximately 700,000, of which at least 200,000 comprised regular field forces. Despite this military strenght, The US considered that the Chinese would not have acted without prior agreement with Moscow and the intervention might even be directed by the Russia (Jervis, 1980: 575; Lowe, 1997: 233).

Although the Chinese People's Volunteers was both not well equipped and mechanized, logistics were organized through manpower that carried military supplies to the front of war. Manpower and strong combat experience played a key role in order to overcome the technological and military superiority. Despite the increased air pressure, designed in part to accelerate the peace negotiations at Panmunjom, U.S. air power could not stop the flow of supplies to Communist ground forces (O'Neill, 2000). In addition, when Chinese intervened in the conflict, the war in air became limited. Thus, Chinese People's Volunteers and the Korean Army recaptured most of territory in the North Korea and they made the United Nations

force to shift to strategic that was a defence positions against communist forces. Shortly thereafter, Eisenhower threatened to use the atomic bomb if China did not stop fighting and ended the Korean War. The Chinese had to accepted a truce, signed on 27 July 1953 (Clare, 2005). Thus, with the change of the US administration, a cease-fire was held on July 27, 1953, and the front lines were considered as the actual border between North and South Korea. Unresolved, the conflict ended, and Korea remained a divided country. Although the problem is not solved, the conflict was ended and Korea remains a divided country.

As a result, when North Korea started to attract against South Korean, the United Nations decided to take military action to the an aggressor state for the first time in the history of international organization. Further the Korean War was the most significant example, which showed that the UN became an arena of ideological struggle between the two poles. During the Korean War, the UN moved from being simply a forum for diplomatic pressure and propaganda to play a forceful role in a way not envisaged by the Charter (Latif, 2000).

LIMITED WAR AS A WARTIME STRATEGY BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS

The Korean War played an important role in defining the new strategic war context established at the beginning of the Cold War (Halperin, 1963; Jervis, 1980; Rapport, 2015; Warden, 2018) . Before the Korean War, the aim of the war had been total victory against enemies; however, the emergence of nuclear power and the development and growth of conventional weapons limited the total war. Although nuclear powers induced caution, it is a fact that nuclear weapons cannot prevent competition, rivalry and conflict between the states. Instead, the nuclear-armed states looked for ways to achieve their goals, as seen in the Korean War, and began to adopt new strategies to combat limited battles without encouraging opponents to retaliate with large-scale nuclear attacks (Warden, 2018: 6). According to this approach, States engaged in limited wars against nuclear armed forces are struggling to prevent another world war and at the same time not to give any "excuses" to initiate a new global war. Of course, in this situation where neither side could gain a decisive advantage by going first, both sides seemed to recognize that, no matter who started the global war, both would suffer major losses (Halperin, 1963: 23). In this sense, both sides set the limits their political and military objectives in the conflict so that the likely costs are acceptable. Thus, this situation would have to show that the aggression between the sides is limited and the conflict should be limited to a low level of violence.

The concept of limited war in today's understood sense was to loom so salient after Korean war. In the years immediately following the end of World War II, the US and the Soviet Union sought credible capabilities and strategies to expand and sustain their areas of influence. Despite their cooperation during the war, the main differences in their ideology and mentality have made a conflict between systems inevitable. The growth of the tension between the two sides became evident in world politics, creating an environment in which each side was forced to move against the other. In many cases, the growing hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union began to be a significant challenge, even for areas that

were not previously considered vital to national security. Thus, the North Korean attack on South Korea was critical because in this new case any change in power or influence represented a potential change in the international picture. In response to the North Korean attack, the United States developed within the framework of its reluctance to allow Soviet influence and power to go beyond its then-current borders (Sweeney, 2007: 8). Accordingly, the United States tried to hinder the success of this Communist because if it allowed Soviets to succeed in Korea, this would encourage aggression elsewhere (Halperin, 1963: 16). In this context, The US clearly did not want to tolerate any Soviet progress in Korea or elsewhere. Yet the US was also aware of the danger of a mutually devastating another world war.

With these considerations, the Korean War demonstrated the willingness of the United States to seek a purpose through limited use of force (Stueck, 2002: 124). The US was still seen to have a clear advantage over nuclear weapons in 1950, but in two respects, the US endeavored to keep the Korean War as a limited war. Firstly, the US was worried about the use of nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union in a war. Firstly, the US concerned that if the nuclear weapons were used against the Soviets in a war, neither side could gain a decisive advantage. While the nuclear capabilities of these countries were relatively smaller compared to today, both sides could benefit from atomic capabilities to engage in direct conflict. By the time the Korean War, although it was not a weapon technology that was in danger of destroying a large part of the United States and the Soviet Union within an hour, there was still a danger of a world war that could have been destructive never before seen (Malkasian, 2001: 8). Indeed, the fact that nuclear weapons were potentially decisive, even if there was not the danger that exists of a sudden unleashing of nuclear missiles in terms of technology revealed the idea that both sides would suffer a major losses. "As a result of strategic considerations as well as practical questions relating to the available stockpile and target selection" - it is important to note that the US stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons is now so great and suitable targets for their use" (Freedman, 1991: 202), the US was a reluctance to use nuclear weapons during the Korean War.

Secondly, even without this threat of a mutually devastating strategic exchange in terms of using atomic bomb, there was a high probability that the danger of a world war was still present. There was a capacity that the United States could attack the Soviet Union and most probably the Soviets could not have prevented this attack (Halperin, 1963: 23). This, of course, could only lead to success in the short term, but would ultimately lead to a situation that could be met by superior power. The use of such a bomb against the Soviet Union, even if the target systems were completely destroyed would cause lead forcing the other into starting a global war. While the Soviet Union had no capacity to US, this attack was probably triggered to the Soviet forces to occupy Western Europe in which could result in Communist domination in the continent. In such a situation, the US could not provide security in Europe without providing a large army. Of course, at that time, it was known that the US has great potential which is a deterrent to any country if they know we are going to get into it (Jervis, 1980: 566). However, the transformation of war from a limited war to a global war will lead to huge increases in US military spending. If the war could

have expanded quickly and decisively, might be in danger of exhausting its nuclear stock and traditional military resources and in turn revealed the need for resources to produce new ones (Halperin, 1963: 27). In this sense, since no country could be stronger than its industrial capacity, it was not likely to take a war that would force its capacity. As a matter of fact, in this period, the idea that the American economy had not been able to withstand higher expenditures was outweighed, and there had been a pressure on politicians to not take steps to cause global war. On the other hand, America's NATO allies, particularly the British, have put considerable pressure on the United States to prevent the expansion of the war and to achieve a quick result. Because the defense efforts in Korea were largely maintained under the auspices of the UN, the US felt that it had to constantly consult with its NATO allies and was influenced by their continuous efforts to stop the expansion of the war and to expose the result.

Thus, these factors created a situation in which the United States had to react to the North Korean attack and at the same time restricted its actions to incite the Soviet Union (Sweeney, 2007: 122). In a fundamental reaction to the Soviet threat, Korea's defense was partly motivated by the sense that there should be a preventive limited war aimed at avoiding a new World War. In other words, the risk of reciprocal destruction has led to more limited means of warfare, while careful measures are being taken to reduce the risk of a conflict that has escalated to the Third World. As a result, the Korean War was the most significant example of such a limit war.

THE DIFFERENCE THE WAR MADE: ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE WARFARE

As has been mentioned above, perhaps the most dramatic and controversial issue in the Korean War was that both sides avoided the use of atomic abilities. The potential use of atomic weapons itself, by its nature, has begun to emerge as a new dimension in the reality of war. When the US lost its nuclear monopoly in August 1949, states have not been able to use the atomic weapon against each other as a requirement of the balance of terror (Halperin, 1963; Jervis, 1980; Rapport, 2015; Warden, 2018; Sweeney, 2007). In this case, the basic question arised was how would states give the struggle. Korean War, in turn, contributed to the answer of the question being asked and began to show at what level the hot wars would take place during the Cold War and at what level not. According to this, the rule began to emerge in a structure that neither the US nor the Soviet Union would directly confront with the other, or show that it could not use all available forces; instead each would seek to confine such confrontations within the sphere in which they had originated (Gaddis, 1997: 104). Of course, these were altered the logic of war. It is clear that Korea triggered them and policy makers, many of whom are familiar with the mentality behind wars like World War II, have had to adapt to a whole new set of rules and assumptions in the new age (Sweeney, 2007: 122).

In this context, the Korean War became particularly important because of the effects of future war. According to the fact that states cannot use nuclear weapons in terms of the balance of terror, they have begun to give importance to the development of new weapons technologies in order to prevail in limited

wars. As a matter of fact, the military strategy of the states led them to increase conventional military capabilities, which were seen as a major deterrent to the general war. This situation has shown parallelism with the incredible change of modern military technologies in the nature of war in the twentieth century (Blancfield, 2002). It was known that the Second World War was the first war in history where modern decisive weapons had been used at the end of the war. Indeed, the atomic bomb is the most obvious example, but the list of military technologies introduced between 1945 and 1950 includes as well jet aircraft, guided missiles, microwave radar, and the proximity fuse, to name just a few (Alex Roland, 2009). While there have been many changes in the nature of the war in twentieth century, the air power perhaps has had considerable impact on war. This development directly affected the course of war in a situation where the deterrence of nuclear weapons in the Korean war was eliminated and in the later process, it has become a key element of the war.

In general, the conflict in Korea has created a significant milestone in recent developments in the war literature in the field of air wars. The first one of these milestones was undoubtedly the first time that air jets began to take place in the air fights. Indeed, the air war in Korea was probably well remembered as the first in which jet aircraft challenged against each other. It was also juxtaposition both old and new military strategies. Although Jet and propelled aircraft fought in the second world war, the Korean War was the first conflict in which air-to-air fighting had involved like the swept-wing the US F-86 Sabre against North Korean MiG-15 fighters that was designed by the Soviet Union. These jets had reflected the latest jets technologies of their time in terms of in terms of speed, range, and weapons and as a natural consequence of this, they played the most important role in the Korean War.

In the first months of the war, the P-80, the F-9 panther, and other jets under the UN administration predominated North Korea's air force of Soviet Yak -9. In the face of the supremacy of the air of the UN, the rapid destruction of the old and relatively small North Korean Air Force was quite easy. Nonetheless, the balance changed with the arrival of the swept wing Soviet MIG-15 (Stokesbury, 1990: 182). It made every American plane in the Korean War obsolete and played an important role in creating the main threat to US Air Operations. In the early phases of the war, the B - 29s were an important striking element of the United States as they flew higher and faster than any of North Korea's Soviet-provided reciprocating-engine aircraft (Dorr, 2014). The introduction of the MiG-15 in November 1950 required the B-29s to be accompanied by escorts. These means that the fast, heavily armed MIG-15 made a real threat to B-29 heavy bombers and even under fighter escorts, such as F-51 and F-80 jet fighters, which was not match for the MIG-15. The aim of the MIG -15 pilots was to protect the airspace against US bombers that wanted to cut off vital resources for China and North Korea land forces. The reality of this situation took place on November 8, when the MIGs collided with a B-29 formation and the F-80 Jet fighter escort (Sadler, 1999: 181). After this attack, the B-29s began to attack only at night and consequently decreased bombing accuracy. In addition, the United States began taking measures against these attacks with the equivalent of the MIG-15, the F-86 Sabre. The duels of Sabre-MiG occurred generally in north-western North Korea,

which became known as a MiG Alley. In this sense, the air war over MIG alley is best remembered for fighter pilots engaged in the first jet to jet combats (Blanchfield, 2002: 28).

The second milestone of the Korean War is the introduction of air-to-air refueling, which has quite a strategic importance today. At the time of the Korean War, air-to-air refueling, which nowadays has a strategic importance, was in the experimental phase. However, this situation was accelerated because of the exigencies of war and had to be put into practice quickly on the battlefield. The Korean War made it necessary to switch from large bombers to small, tactical warplanes, as the B-29s were very easily targeted by the MiG-15 jet fighters (Dorr, 2014). What's more important than MiG 15 attacks was that it was seen that the American bombardment strategy is not a valid strategy for Korea. In fact, the US had envisioned a strategic bombing campaign against North Korea similar to its operations during World War II. Even after dropping the first atomic bombs, the US was focused on the preparation of strategic bombings, and most of military funding had been spent toward the improvement of this mission. The strategy in the beginning of the post-war involved the nuclear and strategic bombardment of the enemy's industrial areas during the period of nuclear monopoly. At the beginning of the war, these bombers were used in bombing missions to destroy several strategic and industrial targets (Blanchfield, 2002: 27). Yet, when the US Air Force had been ordered to attack Korea; It was understood that Korea has no strategic structure other than a few industrial or military targets and the materials necessary for war were supplied by China and the Soviet Union. As a result of these developments, it was recognized that strategic bombing cannot have an impact on war, and tactical aircraft, which was extended by air refueling, was the appropriate way for war strategy to perform many tasks previously performed by heavy bombers. Thus, it was not only lost the superiority of the Soviet jets, but also avoided the high costs, and a more effective strategy could be implemented.

Another favorite aircraft for close air support used was helicopters. The Korean War showed that the first military the use of helicopters on any scale was deployed in the Korean War. "Two early, light models, the Bell H-13 and the Sikorsky H-5, were used primarily and successfully for combat medical evacuation but also for reconnaissance, resupply, and observation" (Sadler, 1999: 77) Thus, helicopters facilitated to evacuated wounded troops from the battlefield and delivered them to behind the front lines. Helicopters took part in the air and sea rescue operations and take on the task of quickly evacuating the stranded soldiers. For many soldiers on the battlefield, helicopters began to be seen as a lifeline that allowed them to evacuate quickly (Feltus, 2000). In this context, Korean War constituted an important experience for the later development of the role of Helicopters on war.

The Korean War also saw the improvements of cargo and personnel transports (Dorr, 2014). Cargo and personnel aircraft has become an immortal aircraft that fly in considerable numbers on into the twenty century. While logistic aircraft deployed and carried troops and equipments in the Second World War, these aircraft was actually designed as a civilian aircraft. For example, Douglas C-47 skytrain and the four

engine C-57 skymaster transports were converted from civilian models. In addition, these aircraft carrying capacities were not enough for the military. The first cargo and personnel transports for military service were used in Korean War.

The first two USAF transports designed specifically for military service saw considerable use in Korea. These were the twin engine C-119 'Flying Boxcar', whose rear door greatly eased entrance and egress of troops and equipment, and four engines C-124, a transport giant of the time, which revolutionized cargo and personnel transport, carrying 200 troops and five times as much material as its predecessors. With the C-124 also dawned the age of air disaster mass casualties (Sadler, 1999: 144).

Finally, the Korean War is defined the new strategic context of warfare that modern decisive weapons had been used the first time in the history of war. In this sense, it represented a new military situation that fist jet to jet aircraft, air-to-air refueling, helicopter and the developed cargo and personnel transports were deployed in the Korean War. Of course, Korea was not a good area to deploy some of these advanced aircraft because of the climate, rice fields and mountainous terrain. Nonetheless, some of them notably made important contributions to gaining superiority in the war. The helicopter, one of these proved itself in Korea, as it could perform the reconnaissance missions and the transport tasks. In addition, carrier aviation looms large in that regard, and it should not be an exaggeration to say that the Korean War saved carrier aviation (Blanchfield, 2002: 29). In order to effectively combat enemy fighter, Korea has brought to the forefront of refueling, which requires a higher priority than in the past. Therefore, these innovations in the Korean War did not only lead to an advantage in the war, but were also pioneers in new technologies and tactics to be used in future wars.

CONCLUSION

On July 27, 1953, a Ceasefire was signed between the United States, North Korea, and China and the front lines were accepted as the de facto boundary between the North and South Korea. Although the problem is not fully resolved, the conflict was ended and Korea has been a divided country. On the other hand, the Korean War was defined the new strategic context of warfare that established in the beginning of Cold War. As it is known, the aim of the war had been total victory against enemies; however, the advent of nuclear powers and the development and growth of conventional weapons caused to restrict the total war. As a matter of fact, this was the first time in the Korean War to become a reality. Indeed, the Korean War created a clear example for the limited war in the Cold War. Both the US and the Soviet Union have shown determination to prevent war from moving beyond their controls. In this sense, both sides set the limits their political and military objectives in the conflict so that the likely costs were acceptable and would avoid to suffer major losses.

In addition, the Korean War was the first major problem to test the UN's capacity to ensure international peace during the Korean War. The United Nation Security Council established a unified command to control all the United Nationals forces in Korea under the direct command of the US army Far East

commander, Douglas MacArthur. This is a unique situation in terms of modern military history, because all the military forces fighting the North Korean occupation were officially held under the umbrella of the UN. It is also clear that the Korean conflict was a key history-shaping event of the 20th century. In other words, the war was the most significant conflict to emerge at the beginning of the Cold War and it led to be decisive the route of the Cold War. In the same vein, the Korea War was a war of firsts: the first jet to jet war, air-to-air refueling cargo and personnel transports, the first helicopter war, and the first war of the nuclear era. So, there were plenty of lessons to be learned, some of which were quickly forgotten, and some of which were easily remembered. The conflict in Korea was expresses a transformation in terms of weapons, tactics and training. It was characterized by more emphasis on change than continuity. It is clear that the Korean War has still taught us about many things, namely combined operation in military alliance, a new military situation, technology and a new international one.

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